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One of the most thoughtful books in recent years on how innovation drives economic growth is Professor William Baumol’s The Free-Market Innovation Machine. In it, Professor Baumol shows that over the past 150 years, per capita
incomes in a typical free market economy have risen at unprecedented levels.
He argues that the engine driving this growth is the competitive pressure a wellfunctioning free market economy places on firms to invest in innovation and to
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IP Antitrust: Keeping the Free-Market Innovation Machine Working
One of the most thoughtful books in recent years on
how innovation drives economic growth is Professor
William Baumol’s The Free-Market Innovation
Machine1. In it, Professor Baumol shows that over
the past 150 years, per capita incomes in a typical free
market economy have risen at unprecedented levels.
He argues that the engine driving this growth is the
competitive pressure a well-functioning free market
economy places on firms to invest in innovation and to
share new technologies with the firms that can use it
most efficiently.
Intellectual property obviously plays a central role
in driving economic growth through innovation. The
protection of IP rights is essential so that companies
and individuals can reap the rewards of their innovation,
without which they would have no incentive to innovate.
Protection of IP rights is also key to promoting the
dissemination of technology; companies are unlikely to
license others to use their technology unless they have
confidence it will not be misappropriated.
For many years, it was widely believed that the
intellectual property and antitrust laws had conflicting
objectives: IPlaws sought to promote innovation by
granting inventors a monopoly while the antitrust laws
sought to prevent monopolies. Today we know better. We
now understand that IPlaw and antitrust share a common
objective and are mutually reinforcing: both seek to
promote economic welfare and growth through the
operation of free market forces. We now also understand
that patents and copyrights, while differing in some
important respects from other types of property,2 no
more give their holder a monopoly than does a deed to a
factory and that a free market cannot operate efficiently
unless we protect property rights, be they intellectual or
otherwise. Finally, we now understand that the antitrust
laws do not seek to prevent monopolies, but only to
prohibit conduct that allows a monopoly to be achieved
or maintained through anticompetitive means rather than
through “competition on the merits.”
This paradigm shift has led antitrust enforcers in
both the United States and Europe and in most other
countries with well-developed competition law regimes

to adopt to a more benign attitude toward intellectual
property rights. The signal event in the United States
was the publication in 1995 by the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission of their joint
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property3(“IP Guidelines”), the tenth anniversary of
which we celebrate this year.
The IP Guidelines
The IP Guidelines explicitly recognize that “the
intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share
the common purpose of promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare.”4 In furtherance of these
shared goals, the IP Guidelines articulate three general
principles for the application of antitrust law to IP
licensing. First, the Agencies regard IP as comparable to
any other form of property for the purposes of antitrust
analysis. Intellectual property, therefore, is “neither
particularly free from scrutiny under antitrust laws, nor
particularly suspect under them.”
Second, the IP Guidelines reject the approach taken in
the early case law and state that, notwithstanding that
case law, the Agencies will not presume that intellectual
property creates market power in the antitrust context.
Even when IP rights grant the power to exclude
competitors with respect to a specific product, the
existence of substitutes may prevent the exercise of
market power.
Third, the IP Guidelines recognize that IP licensing is
generally procompetitive because it provides a means
for integrating intellectual property with complementary
factors of production. Licensing permits more efficient
exploitation of IP rights and benefits consumers through
lower costs and better products.5 In addition, licensing
can increase the incentives for innovation by making it
easier to commercialize.
The IP Guidelines recognize, of course, that licensing
arrangements can sometimes harm competition. This
is most likely when the entities involved are actual or
potential competitors and the licensing agreements
facilitate market division or price fixing among those
firms. Licensing agreements may also harm competition
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Over the ten years since they were published,
the IP Guidelines have played an important role
in promoting more sensible antitrust treatment
of IP licensing agreements.
if they condition access to needed intellectual property on
the licensee agreeing not to deal with competitors of the
licensee, thereby cutting off access to needed inputs or
channels of distribution.
Key Outstanding Issues in U.S. IP Antitrust
Over the ten years since they were published, the
IP Guidelines have played an important role in
promoting more sensible antitrust treatment of IP
licensing agreements. The guidelines have become an
increasingly influential source of guidance, not only
to the Agency and antitrust counselors, but also to the
courts and to other competition authorities worldwide.
Despite the progress that has been made, many key
issues remain unresolved. This article will look at the
five issues that are currently keeping the IP Antitrust
community awake at night.
Refusals to License
As the IP Guidelines explicitly recognize, owners of IP
have no general duty to license their protected property.6
The federal courts of appeal, however, continue to
disagree as to the application of this general principle.
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held in Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. that an IP right
is a presumptively valid justification for a refusal to
share IP with others, but that the presumption could be
rebutted by evidence of an anticompetitive purpose for
the refusal. 7
In a 2000 decision, In re Independent Services
Organization Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, holding that
subjective motivation is immaterial in assessing the
validity of a refusal to license. 8 The court held that “in
the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the
patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws,”
regardless of motivation.
Though the Supreme Court has yet to address this

Applying Article 82, European courts and
agencies have been less reluctant than their
U.S. counterparts to use the antitrust laws to
require compulsory licensing of IP rights

circuit split directly, its recent decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v.Law Offices of Curtis
V.Trinko,9 suggests that its approach will be closer to
the Federal Circuit’s than the Ninth Circuit’s. In Trinko
the Court reaffirmed the general right of a business
to refuse to aid its competitors. The court held that
any exception to this general right should be carefully
limited. The Court described its prior decision in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.10
as setting the “outer boundaries” of antitrust liability
for a refusal to deal. The Court identified two limiting
principles in Aspen: first, in Aspen, the defendant had
discontinued a voluntary and therefore presumably
profitable cooperative arrangement; and, second, in
Aspen, the defendant had refused to sell its competitors
a product (ski tickets) that it sold to the public generally
even though its rival had offered to pay the full retail
price, suggesting that it expected to be able to raise
prices once its rival was excluded from the market. The
Court also declined in Trinko to endorse the so-called
“essential facilities” doctrine developed by some lower
courts, which imposes “liability when one firm, which
controls an essential facility, denies a second firm
reasonable access to a product or service that the second
firm must obtain to compete with the first.” Although
the issue of refusals to license is not fully resolved, the
risk of compulsory licensing has reduced by the Court’s
decision in Trinko.
Presumption of Market Power
One way is which a IP holder may extend its patent
monopoly is by conditioning a license to a needed
patent on the licensee agreeing to purchase other
unpatented products from its, a practice the antitrust
laws refer to as “tying.”
Among the elements required to prove an antitrust
“tying” violation is that the defendant must have
sufficient market power in the market for the tying
product to enable it to force the licensee to take the tied
product. For many years, courts applied a presumption
that patents and copyrights granted market power, a
rule first articulated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Loew’s, Inc.11 This presumption has since
been challenged by lower courts,12 four justices of the
Supreme Court,13 the IP Guidelines,14 and numerous
academic commentators.15 These critics argue that
while IP rights grant the power to exclude competitors
with respect to a specific product, the existence of
substitutes may prevent the exercise of market power.16
Earlier this year the Federal Circuit in Independent Inkv.
Illinois Tool Works,17held that it was bound by Supreme
Court precedent to adhere to the traditional view that
patents create a rebuttable presumption of monopoly
power.18 Because the defendant had not provided any
evidence to rebut the presumption, the court found the
defendant liable for violating antitrust laws.19 In June,
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Federal Circuit’s decision and to decide whether these
earlier cases should be overruled in light of the new
economic learning.
Standards Ambush
Participants in standard setting organizations (SSOs)
may be liable under the antitrust laws when they
unilaterally abuse the standard setting process in a way
that harms competition – a practice sometimes referred
to as “standards ambush.” In a 1996 consent order,
Dell Computer Corp., the Federal Trade Commission
accused Dell of violating antitrust laws when it
participated in a standard-setting process and twice
certified that it had no intellectual property rights to the
proposed standard, only to disclose after the standard
had been adopted that it held a patent on the design.20
As relief, Dell agreed to refrain from enforcing the
patents at issue. 21 The FTC was careful to limit its
discussion in Dell to the facts of the case – where there
is evidence that the standard setting body would have
implemented a different non-proprietary design had it
been informed of the patent conflict and the participant
had failed to act in good faith to identify and disclose
patent conflicts.22 It did not impose a general duty on
participants to search for and disclose relevant patents in
a standard setting process, nor did it impose liability for
an inadvertent failure to disclose patent rights.23
The FTC has sought to apply this notion of standards
ambush in two recent cases. In In the Matter of Union
Oil Company of California,24 the FTC staff alleged that
Unocal violated antitrust laws when it used information
gained from participating in the government-sponsored
development of cleaner-burning gasoline guidelines to
secretly patent the blending process for clean-burning
gasoline.
An administrative law judge dismissed the staff
complaint, but Unocal subsequently agreed to a
consent order requiring it to stop enforcing the relevant
reformulated gasoline patents and release all relevant
gasoline patents to the public.25 In a second case, In
the Matter of Rambus Inc.,26 the FTC staff alleged
that Rambus had engaged in anticompetitive conduct
by failing to disclose relevant patents and patent
applications to fellow members of a SSO. Following an
administrative trial, an administrative law judge ruled
that the FTC had failed to show that Rambus violated
the SSO’s rules or the antitrust laws, and the case is now
pending on appeal before the full Commission.
The key issue in the case is whether the qualified
requirement of disclosure articulated in Dell should
apply to situations where the defendant did not have
an actual patent, but only a pending patent application.
Although the primary policy justification for disclosure

of existing patents – the desire to provide SSOs with
information required to weigh the costs and benefits of
the adoption of proprietary technology as a standard –
also applies to future patent interests, it may be weaker
in the latter case. As one commentator has noted, in the
case of future IP interests, the probabilistic nature of
the information provided is less likely to prove useful
for SSO decisions-making and the cost of disclosure
of future patent interests is significantly greater to the
disclosing entity.27
“Reverse payments” in Patent Litigation Settlement
Another important and unresolved issue in IP Antitrust
concerns whether a patent holder violates the antitrust
laws by making “reverse payments” to an alleged
infringer in order to settle an infringement action. The
issue has arisen prominently in the pharmaceuticals
industry where pioneer drug manufacturers have been
accused of making settlement payments to generic
manufacturers in exchange for delayed market entry of
generic drugs. The FTC has been extremely skeptical of
reverse payments, viewing them as a “red flag”28 and
objective indicia of intent to illegally share monopoly
profits by delaying generic entry. The Sixth Circuit took
an even more skeptical stance with respect to the reverse
payments in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,29
a case concerning an interim settlement agreement that
included reverse payments and a commitment by the
generic manufacturer not to market its generic product.
The court found that the agreement was a per se
violation of antitrust laws because it allocated the drug
market between competitors.30
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a more benign
view of reverse payments. In overturning the FTC’s
decision in Schering-Plough Corp, the court sided with
an administrative law judge’s factual finding that the
reverse payment made by the pioneer manufacturer
was not a quid pro quo for the generic manufacturer’s
delayed market entry, but rather a bona fide royalty for
licenses that the pioneer manufacturer had obtained
from the generic manufacturer. 31 Moreover, the
court noted that the exclusionary effect of a settlement
agreement must be viewed in the broader context
of patents, which “by their nature . . . create an
environment of exclusion.”32 In this case, the settlement
agreement was less exclusionary than the patent
because it allowed entry of generic versions of the drug
substantially before the patent’s expiration, suggesting
that the settlement agreement did not violate antitrust
laws.33 The Eleventh Circuit recently denied an FTC
petition for rehearing and it remains to be seen whether
the FTC will seek Supreme Court review.
Package Licensing as Patent Misuse
“Package licensing” describes the licensing of multiple
items of intellectual property in a single license. While
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

it is conceivable that there may be circumstances in
which such licenses may be anticompetitive, they also
may serve the procompetitive purpose of facilitating
the commercialization of new technologies by assuring
licensees that they will have the right of use whatever
patents they may need to manufacture products
embodying that technology.
For this reason, IP Guidelines provide that such
licenses should be evaluated under the antitrust rule
of reason, which requires an evaluation of both the
potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
in order to determine whether, on balance, the license
is anticompetitive. In its recent decision In the Matter
of Certain Recordable Compact Discs and Rewritable
Compact Discs34 the ITC refused to follow the IP
Guidelines and apply the rule of reason, but instead held
that a package licenses that includes both “essential”
and “non-essential” patents constitutes per se patent
misuse. The case is now pending on appeal before the
Federal Circuit.
IP Licensing in the European Union
Competition law has been one of the successes of the
European Union. The key provisions of EU competition
law are Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome,
which are the EU analogues to sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. Article 81 prohibits agreement that harm
competition and Article 82 makes it unlawful to abuse
a dominant position. Like U.S. law, EU competition
law was initially hostile to IP licensing, but has been
following the U.S. in moving toward a more flexible
approach that recognizes the procompetitive benefits
flowing from such licenses.

A potentially even larger problem looms in
China, which is preparing to adopt an AntiMonopoly Law. These provisions would grant
Chinese regulators extensive power to pursue
compulsory licensing. The draft law also proposes treating excessive pricing as an abuse
of dominance, which may open the door to
regulating royalties in IP licenses.
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations
In May 2004, the European Commission published
a revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption
Regulation (TTBER)35 and new explanatory
Technology Transfer Guidelines36 (“EC Guidelines”).
Much like the 1995 U.S. IP Guidelines, the TTBER
and the EC Guidelines should create a more favorable
climate for IP licensing by moving from a highly
formalistic to a more market-based framework for
regulating technology licenses.

The TTBER creates a safe harbor for bilateral
licensing agreements in which the parties’ combined
market share does not exceed 20 percent (if the
parties are competitors) or the individual market
shares do not exceed 30 percent (if the parties are
not competitors). The safe harbor, however, excludes
agreements that contain certain “hardcore” restrictions
such as allocation of markets or customers, limitation
of output, or restrictions on pricing. It also excludes
agreements among more than two parties, agreements
creating technology pools, patent disputes settlement
agreements and non-assertion agreements.
Agreements that fall outside the TTBER’s safe harbor
must be assessed individually under Article 81 of
the EC Treaty. The EC Guidelines provide a general
framework for assessing the legality of licenses
that fall outside TBBER’s safe harbor. Agreements
containing “hardcore” restrictions are presumptively
illegal. All other agreements falling outside the safe
harbor will be evaluated using an approach that is
very similar to the U.S. rule of reason and requiring
weighing the procompetitive benefits of the licensing
arrangement against any anticompetitive effects
to determine whether, on balance, the licensing
provisions should be found unlawful
Compulsory Licensing
Applying Article 82, European courts and agencies have
been less reluctant than their U.S. counterparts to use
the antitrust laws to require compulsory licensing of IP
rights. Less than four months after the U.S. Supreme
Court in Trinko37 declined to endorse the “essential
facilities” doctrine, the European Court of Justice
applied that doctrine in IMS Health Inc. v. NDC Health
Corporation38 to compel the licensing of IP rights.
In the ECJ case, IMS Health Inc. had copyrighted a
geographical breakdown called a “brick structure”
for processing data received from pharmaceutical
wholesalers. When a competitor, NDC, tried using a
similar structure to provide data collection services,
IMS sued for copyright infringement. NDC, responded
by accusing IMS of violating EU competition law by
refusing to license its proprietary brick structure to
NDC. Following a line of cases that includes Magill39
and Bronner,40 the ECJ held that if the brick structure
is “indispensable” to such data collection services, it
is a violation of EU law to refuse to license the brick
structure, if the following conditions are met: the
prospective licensee intends to offer new products or
services not offered by the copyright owner and for
which there is a potential consumer demand; the refusal
is not justified by objective considerations; and the
refusal is such as to reserve to the copyright owner the
entire market (in this case the supply of data on sales of
pharmaceutical products in the Germany) by eliminating
all competition in that market.
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There is significant ambiguity in the standard adopted
by the ECJ. For example, it is unclear what kind of proof
is required to show intent that alicensee “intends” to
offer a product. Likewise, the level of novelty required
to satisfy the “new product” standard is ambiguous.
Interpretation of such terms by agencies and courts
will determine whether the frequency of compulsory
licensing actually increases in the wake of the IMS
decision. The court’s decision does, however, leave
open the door to compulsory licensing, especially where
de facto industry standards are present. Ultimately,
IMS demonstrates that despite the movement toward a
climate more favorable to IP licensing and convergence
with U.S. IP Antitrust, European competition law is still
decidedly less favorable to the rights of IP owners than
U.S. antitrust law.
IP Licensing in Developing Countries
A key to economic growth in developing countries
is access to technology. Adoption of new technology
increases economic productivity, facilitates the growth
of new industries, and increases the standard of
living. A primary conduit for this valuable technology
transfer is IP licensing. In the early 1990s, inadequate
protection of IP rights and the associated risk of
piracy, risked slowing down licensing by making the
holders of IPrights reluctant to license to licensees in
developing countries. To assuage the fear of IP holders
and encourage technology transfer, the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS) was reached in 1994. TRIPS, which applies
to all members of the WTO, sets out minimum
standards of protection that each country must provide
to IP rights. Under the agreement, patent rights are
enforced regardless of whether the products are foreign
or domestic. TRIPS also expands IP rights to areas
previously unprotected in most developing countries,
such as computer programs and pharmaceuticals.
Despite TRIPS, dangers still remain for IP holders. One
risk is that developing countries may misuse their newly
enacted competition laws to compel licensing on terms
that favor local industry. A recent example is a July
2004 decision of the Taiwanese Intellectual Property
Office (TIPO) in which the Taiwanese government
forced Philips to license CD-R technology to Taiwanese
competitors at lower than market price.41 TIPO based
its decision on a provision of Taiwan’s Patent Law that
permits compulsory licensing where the applicant is
unable “to reach a licensing agreement with the patentee
concerned under reasonable commercial terms and
conditions within a reasonable period of time.”42
A potentially even larger problem looms in China,
which is preparing to adopt an Anti-Monopoly Law.
The most recent draft of the law released in April
2005 contains a strong essential facilities provision,43
as well as an article providing that a business in a

dominant market position may not, “without valid
reasons,” refuse to sell its products.44 Together, these
provisions would grant Chinese regulators extensive
power to pursue compulsory licensing. The draft law
also proposes treating excessive pricing as an abuse
of dominance, which may open the door to regulating
royalties in IP licenses. As the ABA recently concluded,
in its current form China’s Anti-Monopoly law has the
potential to “discourage investment and innovation by
undertakings and therefore could harm competition and
consumers.”45
Faced with these risks, the IP Antitrust community
needs to look for creative ways to promote convergence
in the application of competition laws to intellectual
property along the lines of the U.S. IP Guidelines and
the EU TTBER. One possible path forwardinvolves
the International Competition Network (“ICN”), an
informal network for competition authorities worldwide
that promotes effective antitrust regulation. Since its
inception in 2002, the ICN has played an important role
in promoting international cooperation and convergence
in antitrust enforcement through working groups in
such critical areas as cartels and merger control. Given
the central importance of IP licensing to international
economic development, the ICN should seriously
consider creating an IP working group. An ICN IP
working group could help assure that competition laws
are enforced by all countries in a way that properly
respects the critical role intellectual property rights and
licensing play in keeping the free market innovation
machine working. o
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